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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

a water right superior to the rights of any user outside of Pasco County.
Thomas relied on the Florida Water Production statute, §
373.1961 (1) (e), and other evidence to prove the legislature's intent to
preserve the water rights of the residents of Pasco County. The Florida
District Court of Appeals disagreed based the supremacy and exclusivity of the SFWMD's permitting authority set forth in the Florida Superseded Laws and Regulations statute, § 373.217.
Thus, the court affirmed the decision of the SFWMD and held that
the SFWMD possessed exclusive permitting authority pursuant to the
Florida Superseded Laws and Regulations statute.
Christina Valerio

HAWAII
Lana'i Co. v. Land Use Comm'n, 97 P.3d 372 (Haw. 2004) (holding:
(1) the land use commission's interpretation of agreement and order
for water use to develop golf course was clearly erroneous; and (2) remand was necessary because evidence implying real estate developer
breached agreement and order for water use existed).
Lana'i Company, Inc. ("LCI") sought to expand the Manele Bay
Hotel on the island of Lana'i by constructing a golf course near the
resort. The Land Use Commission ("LUC") approved LCI's petition to
reclassify land for the golf course on the condition that LCI not use
potable water from a high-level aquifer for the project. When LCI used
water from the high-level aquifer, several parties appealed to LUC demanding that LCI stop such water use. LUC issued an order commanding LCI to stop using high-level aquifer water. LCI appealed to
the Second Circuit Court, which reversed LUC's order. LUC and others appealed to the Hawai'i Supreme Court.
LCI's predecessor in interest filed a petition with LUC to amend
the land use district boundaries at Manele, from rural and agricultural
districts to urban districts, for purposes of developing a golf course.
The following year, Lanaians for Sensible Growth ("Sensible Growth"),
the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, and LCI signed a memorandum of
agreement ("Agreement"). The Agreement stated that LCI would (1)
not use water from high-level ground water aquifers to maintain or
operate the proposed golf course; and (2) achieve all irrigation for the
golf course through alternative, non-potable water sources. Sensible
Growth and LCI submitted proposed findings of fact ("findings"), conclusions of law, and orders to LUC. LUC subsequently granted LCI's
petition in 1991 ("1991 Order") and ordered reclassification of the
Manele land.
Pursuant to the 1991 Order, the Maui County Council ("Council")
submitted a letter to Maui's mayor. The letter noted that LCI sought
use of water from a high-level aquifer in direct violation of the Agree-
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ment. The letter requested the mayor stop development of the golf
course pursuant to LCI's Agreement violation. LCI responded that it
planned to use brackish effluent from the high-level aquifer in compliance with local law. Maui's mayor subsequently agreed with LCI, noting there was no specific prohibition against using high-level brackish
water.
The County of Maui Planning Department ("County") joined the
Council to contend that LCI was violating the Agreement, as well as the
1991 Order, by using high-level aquifer water. The County argued that
approval of the golf course project was based on representations made
by LCI that LCI would not use high-level aquifer water for golf course
construction. LCI responded that it was complying with all conditions
imposed upon it with respect to the project.
Subsequent to the Council and the County's complaints, LUC issued an order for all involved parties to show cause why the Manele
land should not revert to its former classification ("Show Cause Order"). LUC based the Show Cause Order on the belief that LCI failed
to act pursuant to the 1991 Order by using high-level aquifer water. In
1996, after Sensible Growth, the County, and LCI submitted testimonies and arguments, LUC found that LCI had failed to act in accordance with the 1991 Order. LUC ordered LCI to cease use of highlevel aquifer water, as well as file a detailed plan outlining how LCI
would use water from alternative non-potable water sources, excepting
the high-level aquifer ("1996 Order"). LCI appealed LUC's decision to
the circuit court.
The circuit court initially upheld both LUC's finding that LCI violated the 1991 Order and LUC's order that LCI submit a plan to obtain
water from sources outside of the high-level aquifer. LCI filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, specifically requesting that the
1996 Order be reversed. Following a denial of that motion by the circuit court and a dismissal of appeal by the court, the circuit court reversed the 1996 Order. The circuit court held that LUC's conclusion
that LCI violated the 1991 Order was arbitrary and capricious and
clearly erroneous. LUC appealed to the Hawai'i Supreme Court.
The court noted it reviewed agency decisions that presented mixed
questions of fact and law under the clearly erroneous standard because
the agency decisions were based upon facts and circumstances specific
to the given case. The court stated that a mixed decision was clearly
erroneous when (1) the record lacked substantial evidence to support
the decision; or (2) an appellate court was left with a firm conviction
that a mistake had been made, despite substantial evidence supporting
the decision.
In addressing the circuit court's ruling that LUC's determination
that the 1996 Order was clearly erroneous, the court first looked at the
plain language of the 1991 Order, specifically the 1991 Order's mandate ordering LCI not to use high-level aquifer water. LCI argued the

Issue I

COURT REPORTS

language of the 1991 Order only prohibited the use of potable water
from the high-level aquifer and, therefore, use of non-potable water
from that aquifer was permissible. LUC and Sensible Growth responded that the 1991 Order prohibited use of all water from the highlevel aquifer. The court found that the plain language of the 1991 Order did not prohibit use of all high4evel aquifer water. Specifically, the
language of the 1991 Order did not forbid use of non-potable water
from the high-level aquifer, nor did the 1991 Order's language indicate that the high-level aquifer only contained potable water. As such,
the court found the 1996 Order to be clearly erroneous because of the
lack of evidence that the 1991 Order meant to exclude LCI from using
non-potable water from the high-level aquifer.
The court next considered LUC's explicit rejection of Sensible
Growth's recommended version of the 1991 Order. Sensible Growth
proposed that no water from the high-level aquifer should be used for
golf course purposes. The court noted that LUC, after looking at Sensible Growth's proposal, adopted LCI's proposed findings regarding
the high-level aquifer into the 1991 Order. Specifically, LUC entered
findings into the 1991 Order that were identical to LCI's proposals.
The court found that because LUC expressly rejected Sensible
Growth's proposal to forbid use of all high-level aquifer water, LUC
could not reasonably assert that it intended to prohibit LCI from using
any high-level aquifer water.
The court lastly noted that a map submitted to LUC clearly indicated that water sources not precluded from use by LCI were inside the
high-level aquifer. Specifically, although a well and the Palawai Basin
were both located inside the high-level aquifer, LUC did not expressly
bar use of those water sources. In fact, a finding from the 1991 Order
recommended use of these water sources because of their brackish
waters. In light of the aforementioned three analyses, the court found
the information submitted pursuant to the Show Cause Order was insufficient to support the conclusion that the 1991 Order barred LCI
from using any high-level aquifer water. As such, the court held the
1996 Order was clearly erroneous.
The court also addressed whether LCI had violated the 1991 Order. Sensible Growth argued that, even if the 1991 Order did not bar
LCI from using any high-level aquifer water, the 1991 Order did bar
LCI from using high-level aquifer potable water. Specifically, Sensible
Growth claimed that the circuit court erred in reversing the 1996 Order because LCI had used potable water from the high-level aquifer in
violation of the 1991 Order. Because LUC had made no specific findings regarding whether LCI had used potable water from the high-level
aquifer, the court remanded the issue back to the circuit court. The
court instructed the circuit court to remand the issue to LUC to clarify
whether LCI had used high-level aquifer potable water. The court thus
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upheld the circuit court's reversal of the 1996 Order, but remanded
the case to LUC to clarify whether LCI had violated the 1991 Order.
Kyle K Chang
IDAHO
McKay v. Boise Project Bd. of Control, No. 28660, 2004 Idaho LEXIS
149 (Idaho 2004) (reversing the lower court's award of damages for the
destruction of a cash crop when the Boise Project Control Board raised
the reservoir water level pursuant to a flowage easement since the plain
language of the easement contained no ambiguity, the activity remained within the parameters of the easement, and the activity was
reasonable; affirming the lower court's holding that the Boise Project
Control Board does not qualify for immunity because the decision to
raise reservoir levels was operational and not discretionary).
In 1979 the Boise Project Control Board ("Project") obtained a
flowage easement from ajudgment that allowed the Project to raise the
level of water in the Hubbard Reservoir to 2,771 feet for any routine
irrigation purpose. The judgment did not require the Project to give
any notice before changing the water level in the reservoir. In 1992
Darwin and Patricia McKay ("McKay") leased a parcel of land located
on the Hubbard Reservoir, which the), used to grow turf grass as a cash
crop. During the spring of 1997, the Project raised the water level in
the Hubbard Reservoir to 2,767.8 feet as part of a plan to provide water
for irrigation. The high water damaged a portion of McKay's crop.
McKay sued the Project for the damage to his crop in the District
Court of the Fourth Judicial District. McKay claimed the Project negligently used the flowage easement and the Project intentionally trespassed on his leasehold. The district court rejected the Project's defense of governmental immunity for performing discretionary functions. The district court then awarded McKay damages because the
Project breached its duty to manage the flowage easement in a reasonable manner and in accordance with the 1979 judgment. Accordingly,
the district court issued a permanent injunction that changed the
scope of the flowage easement from allowing flooding for routine irrigation operations the Project may desire, to provide that the Project
can only flood McKay's estate in the good faith pursuit of legitimate
irrigation goals. The Project appealed the district court's decision to
the Supreme Court of Idaho.
On appeal, McKay argued he lacked privity to the 1979 flowage
easement. McKay asserted he was not a party to the 1979 judgment
and thus not bound by thatjudgment. However, the court determined
McKay failed to raise the issue in a timely manner as required by Idaho
Appellate Rule 15. Therefore, the court refused to consider the issue
of privity.

